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INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the greatest strengths of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (hereafter referred to as 
the FASB or the Board), and one of the strongest reasons for its continuance, is the existence of open due 
process procedures. The mission statement of the FASB includes the precept that the Board must weigh 
carefully the views of its constituents in developing concepts and standards (FASB web site, 
www.FASB.org). Dennis Beresford, former chair of the FASB, has stated that the keys to successful 
accounting standard-setting are a sound due process and the confidence of constituents that their views 
are given careful consideration (Beresford 1995). 
Despite the recognized importance of constituent input, participation in the FASB’s standard-
setting process has been limited. Tandy and Wilburn (1992) estimated that a mere 0.002 percent of 
corporations in the U.S. submitted a comment letter to the FASB concerning the first 100 Statements of 
Financial Accounting Standards (FASs) issued. Companies in the petroleum refining industry, however, 
have been visible participants in this process. An analysis of Fortune 500 companies’ participation from 
1973-1998 reveals that of the 20 companies submitting the greatest number of comment letters, seven were in 
the petroleum refining industry (Tandy and Wilburn 1999). Furthermore, results from prior research indicate 
that differences exist between the petroleum industry and other industries for lobbying behavior, 
accounting choices, and tax rates (Bowen, et al. 1981; Zimmerman 1983; Wilburn and Kilpatrick 1990). This 
study explores further the participation of petroleum refining companies in the standard-setting process 
during the FASB’s first 25 years.  
 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Most of the FASB’s constituents can be categorized into three groups: (1) preparers of financial 
statements (e.g., corporate management); (2) users of financial statements (e.g., investors and creditors); 
and (3) attestors of financial statements (e.g., public accounting firms). While the FASB values input from all 
constituent groups, preparers have dominated the participation process. On documents preceding FAS Nos. 
1-100, 60.7 percent of all individual comment letters were submitted by preparers, including participants 
from the petroleum refining industry (Tandy and Wilburn 1992). 
Prior research investigating the participation of corporate management centers on the development 
of a positive theory of management’s role in the selection of accounting methods and the formulation of 
accounting standards. On a general level, a positive theory asks why management is concerned with the 
accounting procedures used in preparing financial reports. Management’s involvement in external financial 
reporting can be seen in (1) the selection of alternative accounting methods and levels of disclosure, or (2) a 
reaction to proposed or enacted standards in the form of lobbying, discretionary accounting changes, and 
changes in activities of the firm (Kelly 1983). 
A few studies have focused on the selection of alternative accounting methods as specifically 
related to the petroleum industry. Deakin (1979) examined the selection between successful efforts and full 
cost methods and tested the effects on this decision of the company's aggressiveness in exploration, the 
demand for capital, size, and age. Using seven variables to represent these company characteristics, he 
found that full cost companies were more highly leveraged than other companies; however, he did not find 
support for any of the other variables. Lilien and Pastena (1982) also studied the accounting choice between 
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successful efforts and full cost. They examined the impact of each company's size, debt/equity ratio, ratio of 
dry wells/total wells (as a surrogate for variability of earnings), and age on this accounting choice. They 
found that larger and older firms were more likely to use successful efforts while firms with higher 
exploratory risk and more leverage were more likely to use full cost. Johnson and Ramanan (1988) extended 
this research to study oil and gas producing companies that changed from successful efforts to full cost 
accounting during the period from 1970 through 1976. Consistent with results obtained by earlier studies, 
they found that full cost adoption was associated not only with high leverage and capital expenditure levels, 
but also with concurrent increases in debt financing and, to a lesser extent, exploration activities. These 
three studies suggest that, when given a choice, petroleum industry managers have chosen accounting 
methods based upon the economic consequences of these accounting methods on their companies. 
Other positive theory studies have focused on the petroleum industry’s lobbying behavior. Deakin 
(1989) investigated management lobbying on accounting for oil and gas producing activities. Since the issue 
affected a specific industry where the direction of the effect associated with the issue on income and equity 
was almost uniformly the same, it provides an opportunity to study factors that may be associated with the 
decision to lobby. He found that debt covenant, management compensation, regulatory, and financial 
statement effect costs were positively associated with an oil and gas firm's decision to lobby on this issue. 
Wilburn and Kilpatrick (1990) compared the lobbying positions of petroleum industry companies with other 
industrial companies on documents preceding FAS No. 87,  “Employers’ Accounting for Pensions.”  Their 
results indicate differences between the lobbying positions of petroleum industry constituents and other 
industry constituents on issues that affected the balance sheet, the income statement, and leverage 
positions.  
This study expands prior research on the lobbying behavior of petroleum refining companies by 
taking a macro or temporal view of participation on all documents issued over the FASB's 25-year history 
that led to a final statement. We focus on the relatively large companies that have been included on the 
Fortune 500 list during the past 25 years, with an expanded analysis of participation by petroleum refining 
companies and comparisons with participation by other companies. Our first two research questions ask: 
(1) What is the extent of overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation? 
(2) Has overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation changed over time? 
Corporate management is expected to participate in the FASB's standard-setting process if the 
expected benefits of lobbying exceed the perceived costs (Kelly 1983). Benefits may include: 
(a) the advantage to be gained from a favorable outcome (avoidance of costs associated 
with the mandated change in accounting method) weighted by the probability of 
influencing the decision (Kelly 1983; Deakin 1989); 
(b) the advantage to be gained from systematic monitoring of proposed FASB rules 
(e.g., implementation costs may be reduced by earlier knowledge and preparation) 
(Buckmaster and Hall 1990); and 
(c) the psychological benefits of lobbying (e.g., the constituent may believe that 
observable participation will help perpetuate the desired private sector control of the 
standard-setting process).  
The benefits may depend upon the corporation's philosophy toward participating or its preference 
positions taken on issues addressed in relationship to final standard decisions and management's 
understanding of how input affects the standards setting process (Brown 1982). 
Costs of participation may include: 
(a) the costs of systematic monitoring of FASB activities, reading the documents issued by 
the FASB, analysis of the impact of the proposal on the corporation, and performing 
research upon which to base a response (Gaa 1988; Sutton 1984; Buckmaster and Hall 
1990); and  
(b) the costs of participation, including the use of management time in preparing a comment 
letter and/or making a personal appearance at a public hearing. 
 Little is known about the specific costs and benefits of preparer participation, in general, and 
petroleum constituent participation, in particular. However, the scope of the statement under consideration 
may affect the perceived benefits since the outcome of the FASB's deliberations may have a greater impact 
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on an increased number of companies' financial statements if the issue is sufficiently broad. Therefore, our 
third research question addresses whether the scope of the standards (according to their classification as 
substantive, amendment, or industry standards) affects participation: 
(3) Is overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation affected by the scope of the 
standard under consideration? 
After examining overall levels of petroleum constituent participation, we turn to participation by the 
individual Fortune 500 petroleum companies. Since the costs and benefits of participation may differ among 
companies, the companies are expected to differ in levels of participation.  This leads to our final research 
question:  
(4) What is the extent of participation over time by individual Fortune 500 petroleum refining 
companies? 
 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
Our database is comprised of data on participation for Fortune 500 petroleum refining and other 
industrial companies on the 173 documents issued from 1973-1997 preceding FAS Nos. 1-133. These 
documents include Discussion Memorandums, Invitations to Comment, Exposure Drafts, and Revised 
Exposure Drafts, as well as other less-frequently used documents, issued in developing the final statements. 
We define participation as the submission of comment letters, since testimony at public hearings must also 
be accompanied by a comment letter or presentation outline. In order to limit the number of companies 
tracked over the 25-year period, we use Fortune 500 industrial companies because changes over time (such 
as name changes, mergers, etc.) can be identified with information provided in the Fortune listings.1  For 
each year from 1973-1997, we identify the petroleum refining and other Fortune 500 companies and then 
examine whether those companies participated on documents issued during that year. 
To develop our participation database, we obtained information from two sources: 
(1) The FASB’s Index to Submissions for each document, which lists the specific respondents; and 
(2) Fortune 500 industrial rankings for each year from 1973-1997.  
For our analysis, we classify each FASB document by (1) the category of scope of the related final 
standard and (2) the period issued, as follows: 
(1) Substantive Standard : sets standards for accounting issues where standards did not previously 
exist, or completely supersedes prior standards; 
(2) Industry Standard : pertains to industry-specific accounting issues, or to a specialized group of 
entities such as governmental or not-for-profit; or 
(3) Amendment: amends, revises, interprets, clarifies, or supersedes a portion of a previous standard 
(although an industry-specific amendment is classified as an industry standard). 
 
We divide the FASB’s 25 years into five periods of five years each: 1973-1977; 1978-1982; 1983-
1987; 1988-1992; and 1993-1997. 
                    
1 Starting in 1994, Fortune merged rankings for industrials and service firms. In order to maintain 
consistency of our sample throughout the entire 25-year period in this study, we use only the industrial 
firms ranked in the Fortune 1000 for 1994-1997 (which results in 433 firms for 1994, 430 for 1995, 424 for 1996, 
and 424 for 1997). For convenience in this paper, we still refer to these industrial companies as the Fortune 
500. We exclude companies listed in the service 500 because these listings are not available prior to 1983; 
prior to 1983 Fortune presented “top 50” lists for six industries, which subsequently became part of the 
service 500. 
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Table 1 indicates that we classify 44 final statements as substantive, 41 as industry, and 48 as amendments, 
resulting in classification of the 173 documents preceding these statements as 78 substantive, 42 industry, 
and 53 amendments. Of the 42 industry documents, seven pertain to oil and gas producing companies. 
There were 36 documents issued in period one, and 64, 28, 24, and 21, in periods two, three, four, and five, 
respectively.  
 
 
Table 1 
Classification of Scope of Standards and Preceding Documents 
  Substantive  Industry Amendment Total 
No. of Final FAS’s: 44 41 48 133 
% of 133 33.1% 30.8% 36.1%  
      
No. of Preceding Documents 
Issued in Period: 
    
 One (1973-1977) 23 3 10 36 
 Two (1978-1982) 20 23 21 64 
 Three (1983-1987) 12 7 9 28 
 Four (1988-1992) 10 6 8 24 
 Five (1993-1997) 13 3 5 21 
 Total 78 42 53 173 
% of 173 45.1% 24.3% 30.6%  
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
(1) What is the extent of overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation? 
Table 2 presents summary data regarding Fortune 500 participation on the 173 documents 
included in this study. Descriptive statistics in Panel A show that petroleum refining companies comprise a 
mean of 6.6 percent of all Fortune 500 companies. However, petroleum refining companies submitted 1,033 
comment letters, representing 17.8 percent of all Fortune 500 letters. The mean (median) percentage of 
petroleum companies participating was 18.4 percent (13.9 percent) with a range of 0 percent to 66.7 percent. 
Petroleum industry participation is substantially greater than other industrial companies' participation with a 
mean (median) participation rate of 5.9 percent (3.7 percent) and a range of 0 percent to 33.3 percent. 
Frequency data in Panel B indicate that over 50 percent of petroleum companies submitted comment letters 
on nine documents, whereas no petroleum refining companies participated on 28 documents. 
 
Table 2 
Summary Data for Fortune 500 (F500) Petroleum Refining Company and 
Other Industrial Company Participation on the  
173 Documents Preceding FAS Nos. 1-133 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics   
Total Petroleum Refining letters on all documents 1,033 
Total F500 letters on all documents  5,791 
Petroleum letters as a percentage of F500 letters 17.8% 
Mean percentage of number of petroleum companies in F500 6.6% 
  
% of Petroleum 
Companies 
Participating  
% of Other 
Industrial Companies 
Participating 
Mean per document  18.4%    5.9% 
Standard deviation  16.4%    6.9% 
Minimum    0.0%    0.0% 
Median  13.9%    3.7% 
Maximum  66.7%  33.3% 
Panel B: % of F500 Petroleum Companies Participating Per Document 
% of Petroleum 
Companies Participating  
Number of 
Documents  % of Total 
              0%    28  16.2% 
  >0%-10%    39  22.5% 
>10%-20%    38  22.0% 
>20%-30%    22  12.7% 
>30%-40%    25  14.5% 
>40%-50%    12    6.9% 
>50%-60%      6    3.5% 
>60%-70%       3      1.7% 
Total  173   
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Table 3 lists the documents that elicited the most Fortune 500 petroleum refining participation in 
terms of percentage of petroleum companies responding. Four of the top ten documents pertain to industry 
standards related to oil and gas producing companies, with the greatest participation for the Exposure Draft  
preceding FAS No. 19 on financial accounting and reporting by oil and gas producing companies. The other 
top six documents relate to substantive standards for pensions and other postretirement benefits, changing 
prices, income taxes, and leases.  
 
Table 3 
Top Ten Documents on Percentage of  Fortune 500 Petroleum Refining Companies Participating 
 
Final 
FAS 
No. 
 
 
Scope of 
Statement 
 
 
Document 
Date 
 
Type of Document* and Title 
No. of 
Petroleum 
Letters 
No. of F500 
Petroleum 
Cos. 
% of 
Petroleum Cos. 
Responding 
19 Industry 07/15/77 ED: Financial Accounting and 
Reporting by Oil and Gas 
Producing Companies 
22 33 66.7% 
19 Industry 12/23/76 DM: Financial Accounting and 
Reporting in the Extractive 
Industries 
18 28 64.3% 
9 Industry 04/25/75 ED: Accounting for Income Taxes: 
Oil and Gas Producing 
Companies— an amendment of 
APB Opinions No. 11 and 23 
18 29 62.1% 
106 Substantive 02/14/89 ED: Employers’ Accounting for 
Postretirement Benefits Other 
than Pensions 
14 27 51.9% 
35 Substantive 04/14/77 ED: Accounting and Reporting by 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans 
17 33 51.5% 
69 Industry 05/13/81 IC: Disclosures About Oil and Gas 
Producing Activities 
21 41 51.2% 
87,106 Substantive 11/00/82 PV: Employers’ Accounting for 
Pensions and Other 
Postemployment Benefits 
19 38 50.0% 
82,89 Substantive 12/27/83 IC: Supplementary Disclosures 
about the Effects of Changing 
Prices 
18 36 50.0% 
96 Substantive 08/29/83 DM: Accounting for Income Taxes 18 36 50.0% 
13 Substantive 11/06/75 ED: Accounting for Leases 14 29 48.3% 
*   Abbreviations used are:  ED—exposure draft; DM—discussion memorandum; IC—invitation to comment; PV—preliminary views 
 
 
As Table 4 indicates, there are 28 documents with zero letters from Fortune 500 petroleum refining 
companies. Of these, 19 documents pertain to industry standards for other industries, six are amendments, 
and three are substantive standards. The documents related to substantive standards include the Revised 
Exposure Draft  for accounting for contributions, the Exposure Draft  for transfers and servicing of financial 
assets and extinguishments of liabilities, and the Tentative Conclusions for hedging and other risk-
adjusting activities. 
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Table 4 
Documents with the Zero Letters from Fortune 500 Petroleum Refining Companies 
Final 
FAS 
No. 
 
Scope of 
Statement 
 
Document 
Date 
 
 
Type of Document* and Title 
17 Amendment 08/08/77 ED: Accounting for Leases: Initial Direct Costs—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 13 
44 Industry 10/24/80 ED: Accounting for Intangible Assets of Motor Carriers—an amendment of Chapter 5 of ARB 43 and an interpretation of      
APB Opinions 17 and 30 
45 Industry 12/01/80 ED: Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue 
50 Industry 06/12/81 ED: Accounting by the Entertainment Industry: Records and Music 
51 Industry 06/12/81 ED: Accounting by the Entertainment Industry: Cable Television 
53 Industry 06/12/81 ED: Accounting by the Entertainment Industry: Motion Picture Films  
54 Industry 11/16/81 ED: Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: Investment Companies—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 33 
60 Industry 11/18/81 ED: Accounting by the Insurance Industry: Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises 
61 Industry 11/18/81 ED: Accounting by the Insurance Industry: Accounting for Title Plant 
63 Industry 06/12/81 ED: Accounting by the Entertainment Industry: Broadcasters 
65 Industry 02/03/82 ED: Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities 
72 Industry 10/07/82 ED: Accounting for Certain Acquisitions of Banking or Thrift Institutions—an amendment of APB Opinion No. 17 and  an  
     interpretation of APB Opinion No. 16 
75 Industry 06/07/83 ED: Deferral of the Effective Date of Certain Accounting Requirements for Pension Plans of State and Local Governmental  
     Units—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 35 
91 Amendment 09/28/84 IC: Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated With Originating or Acquiring Loans  
93 Industry 12/23/86 ED: Recognition of Depreciation by Not-for-Profit Organizations 
113 Industry 03/00/92 ED: Accounting and Reporting for Reinsurance of Short-Duration and Long-Duration Contracts 
116 Substantive 11/00/92 RED: Accounting for Contributions Received and Contributions Made 
117 Industry 08/29/89 IC: Financial Reporting by Not-For-Profit Organizations: Form and Content of Financial Statements 
117 Industry 10/23/92 ED: Financial Statements of Not-For-Profit Organizations 
118 Amendment 03/31/94 ED: Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan-Income Recognition—an amendment of FASB Statement No. 114 
120 Industry 03/24/94 ED: Accounting and Reporting by Mutual Life Insurance Enterprises and by Insurance Enterprises for Certain Long-               
Duration  Participating Contracts—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 60, 97, and 133 
122 Industry 06/28/94 ED: Accounting for Mortgage Servicing Rights and Excess Servicing Receivables and for Securitization of Mortgage Loans 
124 Industry 03/31/95 ED: Accounting for Certain Investments Held by Not-For-Profit Organizations 
125 Substantive 10/24/95 ED: Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities 
126 Amendment 09/20/96 ED: Elimination of Certain Disclosures About Financial Instruments by Small Nonpublic Entities—an amendment of              
FASB Statement No. 107 
127 Amendment 11/11/96 ED: Deferral of the Effective Date of Certain Provisions of FASB Statement No. 125—an amendment of FASB Statement       No. 
125 
132 Amendment 07/31/95 PRS: Disclosure Effectiveness 
133 Substantive 06/00/93 TC: A Report on Deliberations, Including Tentative Conclusions on Certain Issues, Related to Accounting for Hedging and      
Other Risk-Adjusting Activities 
*  Abbreviations used are:  ED—exposure draft; RED—revised exposure draft; IC—invitation to comment; PRS—Prospectus; TC—Tentative Conclusions 
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(2) Has overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation changed over time? 
(3) Is overall Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation affected by the scope of the 
standard under consideration? 
We use analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test for significant differences in the mean percentage of 
Fortune 500 petroleum companies participating per document for: (1) the scope of the standard, (2) the 
period, and (3) the interaction of scope and period.2  Results in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that the 
percentage of petroleum companies participating depends on both scope of the standard and period, as well 
as the interaction of scope and period (scope, p = 0.0001; period, p=0.0001; interaction, p=0.0001).  
 
Table 5 
ANOVA and Multiple Comparison Results 
Panel A: ANOVA: Dependent Variable—% of Fortune 500 Petroleum Refining Companies Participating Per 
Document 
 
Source 
 
DF  
Sum of 
Squares  Mean Square  
 
F Value  
 
p Value 
Scope 2  6,159.28  3,079.64  21.03  0.0001 
Period 4  6,749.69  1,687.42  11.52  0.0001 
Scope ´ Period 8  10,520.01  1,315.00  8.98  0.0001 
Error 158  23,133.48  146.41     
          
Panel B: Multiple Comparisons Tests* 
   Scope of Standard 
   Substantive  Amendment Industry 
 
Mean % of Petroleum Cos. Participating 
 
26.50% 
 
12.98% 
 
10.31% 
    **************************
** 
      
 Period Document Issued 
 1 (73-77) 3 (83-87) 4 (88-92) 2 (78-82) 5 (93-97) 
Mean % of Petroleum Cos. 
Participating 
 
25.61% 
 
21.16% 
 
16.93% 
 
16.20% 
 
10.97% 
 *************************   
  **************************************  
   ************************************* 
* Means underlined with ***** are not significantly different at the .05 level using Duncan’s Multiple Range test. 
 
 
Panel B reports results of multiple comparisons tests that further examine significant differences in 
participation detected in the ANOVAs. We perform comparisons across scope and periods for the mean 
percentage of Fortune 500 petroleum companies participating. Results for scope indicate that participation 
on substantive standards (26.50%) is significantly greater than that for amendments (12.98%) and industry 
standards (10.31%), while there is no significant difference detected between participation on amendments 
and industry standards. However, it should be noted that the mean participation percentage for industry 
                    
2 We also perform an ANOVA using the number of petroleum letters as the dependent variable. Results are 
consistent with those using the percentage of petroleum companies participating. 
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standards includes participation on oil and gas related documents.3 Further analysis reveals that the mean 
percentage for the seven oil and gas industry documents is 49.77 percent whereas the mean percentage for 
the 35 remaining other industry documents is only 2.43 percent. The highest level of petroleum industry 
participation is for period one (1973-1977), with a mean participation rate of 25.61 percent, and the lowest 
level is for period five (1993-1997), with a mean participation rate of 10.97 percent.  
The significant interaction of scope and period is graphically presented in Figure 1. The interaction 
is due to the level of participation on industry documents (which includes documents relating to oil and gas 
accounting) in period one. As noted in Table 3, this period includes three oil and gas industry documents 
that generated unusually high levels of participation from petroleum companies. Period five includes nine 
documents out of 21 that generated a zero participation rate.  
 
 
 (4) What is the extent of participation over time by individual Fortune 500 petroleum refining 
companies? 
Table 6 identifies the 15 petroleum refining companies that are included in the Fortune 500 lists all 
25 years and describes their participation. All of the petroleum refining companies participated to some 
extent on the 173 documents included in this study. Not surprisingly, the highest participation rate was for 
oil and gas industry documents, with eight companies submitting six or seven letters on the seven 
documents. Exxon submitted the most comment letters, with 54 letters on substantive documents (69 percent 
participation rate), 28 letters on amendments (53 percent participation rate), seven letters on oil and gas 
industry documents (100 percent participation rate), and five letters on other industry documents 
(14 percent participation rate). Of the petroleum refining companies, Murphy Oil participated the least, 
submitting a total of nine comment letters. 
 
                    
3 We did not analyze oil and gas related documents as a separate category of scope in the ANOVA since 
there were no oil and gas related documents in three of the five periods. 
Figure 1                                                            
Interaction of Scope and Period
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Table 6 
Participation by Individual Fortune 500 Petroleum Refining Companies 
 Number of Letters Submitted per Type of Document 
 
Company 
 
Substantive  
(n = 78) 
 
Amendment 
(n = 53) 
Oil and Gas 
Industry 
(n = 7) 
Other 
Industry 
(n = 35) 
 
Total 
(n = 173) 
Exxon 54 28 7 5 94 
Texaco 61 23 6 1 91 
Chevron 53 14 6 0 73 
Mobil 55 8 6 0 69 
Amoco 44 17 7 0 68 
USX 37 18 4 2 61 
Unocal 37 14 7 2 60 
Phillips Petroleum 40 12 6 1 59 
Atlantic Richfield 38 7 6 3 54 
Sun 16 2 5 0 23 
Amerada Hess 13 5 1 0 19 
Kerr-McGee 12 4 0 0 16 
Ashland 9 4 2 0 15 
Pennzoil 10 1 4 0 15 
Murphy Oil 3 3 3 0 9 
 
 
 
Table 7 presents data regarding the total number of comment letters submitted by the 15 petroleum 
refining companies versus the 163 other industrial companies that were included in the Fortune 500 lists all 
25 years. Compared with other industrial companies, the petroleum refining industry is more active in 
participation, with 60 percent of the companies submitting over 50 comment letters. Only 9.2 percent of other 
industrial companies submitted over 50 comment letters and 5.5 percent did not submit any letters on the 173 
documents. 
 
  
Table 7 
Participation by Individual Fortune 500 Companies 
 
Total Number of 
Letters Submitted*   
Number (%) of 
Petroleum Companies 
(n=15)  
Number (%) of Other 
Industrial Companies 
(n=163) 
0  0  (  0.0%)  9  (  5.5%) 
1-25  6  (40.0%)  109  (66.9%) 
26-50  0  (  0.0%)  30  (18.4%) 
51-75  7  (46.7%)  9  (  5.5%) 
76-100  2  (13.3%)  6  (  3.7%) 
* The most letters submitted by an individual company was 97 from General Electric. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study presents an examination of the Fortune 500 petroleum refining industry participation in 
the FASB's standard-setting process. Although petroleum companies comprise only 6.6 percent of Fortune 
500 companies, they submitted approximately 18 percent of all Fortune 500 comment letters on the 173 
documents preceding FAS Nos. 1-133, with an average of 18.4 percent of petroleum companies participating 
per document. The level of petroleum industry participation is affected by the scope of the standard under 
consideration and the time period the document was issued. Substantive standards generate significantly 
more letters from petroleum companies than amendments or industry standards. However, industry 
standards in the period 1973-1977 attracted the highest level of petroleum refining industry participation 
driven by the oil and gas industry documents issued in that period.    
All of the individual petroleum refining companies that are listed on the Fortune 500 throughout 
the 25-year period submitted comment letters, ranging from nine to 94 letters. Compared to individual 
companies in other industries, the petroleum companies participate much more frequently. 
Results in this study confirm and expand those from prior research. Results suggest that 
researchers need to include controls for industry affiliation in their statistical design and/or evaluate the 
sensitivity of the results for industry affiliation. Future research may expand the scope of this study by 
further examining participation by individual petroleum companies and the factors affecting the participation 
choice.  
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